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The Mojave Desert as Grounds for Change: Clarifying Property
Rights in California's Groundwater to Make Extraction
Sustainable Statewide
Kelley J. Hart*
Because most available surface water sources have already been
exploited, Californians have increasingly relied upon groundwater and are
pressuring policymakers to devise creative solutions using groundwater to meet
the thirsty state's demand for water. However, many groundwater basins in
California have already been severely overdrafted. California's groundwater
depletion problem is two-fold: one of both supply and demand. First,
groundwater is often extracted at the cost of long-term basin sustainability.
Second, groundwater demand reflects wasteful consumption habits by
Californians. Although inflated water demand is a serious issue, this paper
seeks to address only problems of groundwater supply.
California law governing the state's 450 known groundwater basins does
not adequately recognize the scientific complexity of groundwater that gives it
persistent commons' attributes.' In some situations, a commons' tragedy can
be avoided by imposition of a private property system. However, because the
common law-based private property system in groundwater remains plagued by
uncertainty, this precious natural resource is now partially depleted and
contaminated. Moreover, the California legislature has basically ignored the
needs of its groundwater basins.2
* Staff Attomey for Wells Environmental Law Clinic at UCLA School of Law; candidate for
M.A. in Urban Planning, UCLA School of Public Policy and Social Research; J.D., UCLA School
of Law, 2002; B.A. Dartmouth College, 1997. I wish to express my gratitude to UCLA School of
Law Professor Jody Freeman for sharing her passion for environmental law and for generously
supporting my intellectual endeavors. Many thanks also to UCLA School of Law Professor
Steven Munzer for supervising this paper in its early stages, and to the editorial board of The
West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy for their contributions to later drafts.
I. For an explanation of the "tragedy of the commons," see infra Part II.A.
2. Califomia's new water planning legislation, Senate Bill 221, Senate Bill 610 and
Assembly Bill 901, do not begin to resolve the state water shortage. While legislators should be
commended for attempting to add a layer of accountability to urban water use supply with this
recent legislation, they unfortunately get no closer to a long-term solution. Each bill
essentially requires that large-scale project developers locate a water supply for future
inhabitants. This legislation addresses neither the problem of supply nor of demand, instead
putting the onus improperly on the middleman, the water agency. There is still no incentive
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Recent events concerning the Mojave Desert highlight the dire need for
groundwater rights clarification. First, the California Supreme Court rejected a
trial court's physical solution3 to bind parties claiming ambiguous rights to
extract groundwater.4 Water extraction continues unchecked by basin users who
have opted out of the stipulated judgment. Second, the Metropolitan Water
District ("MWD") has seriously considered partnering with Cadiz, Inc. ("Cadiz")
on a conjunctive useand water marketing project to exploit the aquifer beneath
Cadiz's property.' Much of the land overlying the aquifer system is treasured
national park and wilderness set aside to protect rare and endangered plant and
animal species. Cadiz proposes to artificially add and remove water from the
aquifer, jeopardizing the natural balance of the neighboring desert ecosystem in
the process. To prevent overdrafting this groundwater basin and others,
usufructuary rights must be clarified before anyone initiates projects of this sort.
Only a statewide approach can address the hydrologic system of surface and
groundwater flows that interchange above and below the ground irrespective of
municipal and county boundaries. Since the common law cannot resolve the
crisis, the legislature must speak through statute. But because claims are highly
individualized, a catered, quasi-judicial solution is also necessary. The California
legislature should require the adjudication of rights in each basin. The statute
must detail central recordkeeping and enforcement mechanisms to assure that
groundwater allocation rights are respected. Although this proposal will not
entirely resolve the water supply crisis, it will stabilize groundwater resources,
which constitute 30% of the state's applied water source.6
Part I of this paper describes groundwater resources in California, as well
as the science and state law governing groundwater. Part II argues that
groundwater supply problems, namely overdraft, can only be solved by state
legislation mandating adjudication of all claims to water use in California's
groundwater basins.7 Part III proposes a statewide system for adjudication and
comprehensive groundwater management.
for individuals to reduce consumption and no incentive for pumpers to reduce overdrafting.
Instead, there is more incentive to pressure water agencies to provide more water.
3. A "physical solution" is an arrangement between parties "fashioned when the strict
application of water rights in a case will result in waste and some other appropriation of
water would protect vested rights and prevent waste." JEFFREY S. ASHLEY AND ZACHARY A.
SMITH, GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 45 (University of Nebraska Press 1999).
4. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224 (2000).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE BULLETIN
160-98, ES3-5 (1998), available at httpJ/rubicon.water.ca.gov/b I 6Oindex.html.
7. Rights to water in fifteen basins have been adjudicated under our common law
system. See infra note 102.
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Part I
A. Water in California, Where Supply Can't Meet Demand
Californians already demand more water than is available. Average annual
water use in 1995 was 79.5 million acre-feet ("maf"), a level of demand that
exceeded supply by 1.6 maf.9 Urban, agricultural, and environmental users
procured water from the following sources: 65.1 maf from surface water, 12.5 maf
from groundwater, and 0.3 maf from recycling and desalinization processes. °
Groundwater supplies about 30% of the state's urban and agrarian water needs.'
The California Department of Water Resources ("Department") recognizes that
many groundwater basins are already overdrafted, but believes that statewide
groundwater overdraft will not increase by 2020. By 1980, the Department had
already identified 42 overdrafted groundwater basins. 2 About 1.5 maf/year were
overdrafted by 1995.3 The Department expects overdraft to decline to 1.1 maf/year
by 2020 4 even though the state's population will likely increase by 15 million people
over the same period, with an estimated demand of an additional 3.2 maf of water
each year. The Department projects that increased demand will be met, in part, by
extracting an additional 165,000 acre-feet of groundwater, presumably from basins
that can spare the water and still maintain a safe yield. 6
Pressure to extract more water from aquifers will also increase because
California must find a substitute source for almost 800,000 acre-feet/year of
Colorado River water. California has historically diverted as much as 5.2 maf from
8. To visualize one acre-foot of water, imagine one acre of land covered by one foot of water.
One acre-foot is approximately 326,000 gallons. According to 1995 average water demand
projections, urban uses demanded.8.8 maf, agriculture required 33.8 maf, and environmental uses
required 36.9 maf. CAUFORNI DEPARMEN OFWAIER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES5-2 (Table ES5-1).
9. Id.
10. id.
11. GOVRNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, CRITICAL WATER SHORTAGE
CONTINGENCY PLAN 1-4. (December 29, 2000).
12. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 39.
13. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OFWATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES3-7 (Table ES3-2).
14. Id.
15. Id. at ES5-3.
16. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES3-5 (Table ES3- I)
and ES3-7 (Table ES3-2). Overdraft occurs when the amount of groundwater extracted from
the aquifer is greater than the amount of water replenishing the aquifer. DAVID H. GETCHES,
WATER LAw IN A NUTSHELL 239 (West Publishing Co. 1997). Overdraft is measured as a long-
term trend, and should not reflect the annual difference between extraction and recharge
from natural fluctuations between drought and flood years. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES3-5. Negative effects of overdrafting are discussed infra Part
I.C.
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the Colorado River annually,'7 although technically entitled to only 4.4 maf under
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, according to the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California.'" Pursuant to the Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines issued
January 25, 2001, California has until 2015 to reduce its diversions from 5.2 maf to
4.4 maf.'9 The Department expects that void will be filled with surface water from
the Central Valley Project and State Water Project, in addition to increased
extraction from groundwater basins." There are 450 known groundwater basins in
California containing up to 850 million acre-feet of water.2' Despite increased
reliance on this resource, the state does not regulate groundwater extraction.
B. The Science of Groundwater
The California Water Code defines groundwater as "all water beneath the
surface of the earth within the zone below the water table in which the soil is
completely saturated with water, but does not include water which flows in
known and definite channels."2' The law distinguishes percolating water from
that which flows in underground streams, 23 but water moving beneath the
surface is more complicated than the law suggests.
In the natural hydrologic cycle, "some of ithel water that falls to the earth's
surface will seep into the ground and be pulled downward by gravity until it
reaches a depth where the subsurface is saturated with water."'4 This level is the
water table, and groundwater flows beneath it." Groundwater moves within the
geologic formation beneath the water table, in both confined and unconfined
17. GOVERNOR's ADvISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, supra note 11, at 2-4.
18. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 580 (1963) (The Act devised a numeric
allocation, but permitted Arizona, California and Nevada, the Lower Basin states, to select
different terms if agreed upon by state compact.).
19. See Department of the Interior, Record of Decision: Colorado River Interim
Surplus Guidelines, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,772-7,782 (2001).
20. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES5-2.
2 1. ARTHUR L. LrTTLEWORTH & ERic L. GARNER, CALIFORNLA WATER 2 (1995); State Water
Resources Control Board, Ground Water in California 2 at www.swrcb.ca.gov/
general/publications/docs/ground-water.pdf (last visited May 6, 2002).
22. CAL. WATER CODE § 10752(a) (Deering 2001).
23. Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 617-18 (1899); Vineland Irrigation Dist. v.
Azusa Irrigating Co., 126 Cal. 486, 494 (1899) ("It is essential to the nature of percolating
waters that they do not form part of the body or flow, surface or subterranean, of any stream.
They may either be rain waters which are slowly infiltrating through the soil, or they may be
waters seeping through the banks or bed of a stream which have so far left the bed and the
other waters as to have lost their character as part of the flow."')
24. ErikSwenson, Pub/i Trust Doctrine and Groundwter Rights, 53 U. Mmu L. REv. 363,372 (1999).
25. id.
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aquifers.26 In a confined aquifer, water is under pressure because it is overlaid by
impermeable rock or clay through which it cannot pass." In contrast, water in an
unconfined aquifer can move from the water table to the base of the aquifer
because there is no impermeable geologic material to thwart its passage."
Aquifers are often hydrologically connected to each other and to surface
water.2 9 The locational flow of water will vary depending on the water level in
each system.3° Water will percolate from a system of higher elevation down to
the base water table level.3' Groundwater moves slower than surface water
because groundwater is usually traveling through the pores of geologic
formations. 2  There is immense variation in porosity between and within
geologic formations. Higher porosity means that more water can be stored in
the rock.33 Permeability corresponds to the size of pores and describes "the ease
through which water flows through a geologic formation."34  There are
comparatively large gaps through which the water can pass in sand and gravel
so it is characterized as having high porosity and high permeability.35
C. Groundwater Quality and Quantity In California Today
The percolation process normally filters out contaminants in water as it
moves through the strata of geologic formations. However, groundwater will
transport certain types of contaminants in soil saturated with chemicals. As a
result, a number of California aquifers are contaminated by pesticides and other
agricultural by-products.36 Some have been degraded by salt water intrusion
and others by industrial chemicals. As a result, the quality of the groundwater
depends not only on the quality of water percolating from the surface, but also
on what is already deposited in the sediments through which the water passes. 7
26. Id.
27. Id. n.78 (citing C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 5, 101-02 (2d ed. 1988)); Ella
Foley-Gannon, Institutional Arrangements for Conjunctive Water Management in California and Analysis
of Legal Reform Alternatives, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 273, 279 (2000).
28. Swenson, supra note 24, at 372 n.78.
29. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27.
30. id.
31. id.
32. Swenson, supra note 24, at 372.
33. Id. at 373.
34. Id.
35. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27.
36. Jodie T. Raccio, Agricultural Use of Pesticides: Farmer and Manufacturer Liability for
Groundwater Contamination, 3 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 185, 187 (1993) (citing PATFICK W. HOLDEN,-
PESTICIDES AND GROUNDWATER OUALrrY-IssuEs AND PROBLEMS IN FOUR STATES 4 (1986)).
37. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 280.
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As mentioned in the first section, at least forty-two of California's
groundwater basins are already overdrafted.38 There are many negative
consequences of overdrafting an aquifer. First, because the water table drops,
extractors must dig deeper wells and pumping becomes more expensive.
39
Second, when an aquifer is overdrawn for an extended period, the water-bearing
geologic formations are compacted. The land is pulled downward, causing
subsidence at the surface." One area of the Santa Clara Valley subsided 28 feet
between 1933 and 1967"' and some parts of the San Joaquin Valley have
subsided 30 feet because of groundwater overdrafting 2 Third, vegetation above
an overdrafted aquifer is likely to die as the surface is "desertified." 13 Finally,
salt-water intrusion irreversibly contaminates aquifers near the coast."
D. California's Groundwater Law
Responsibility for groundwater protection has been left to the individual
states.45 In California, the right to use groundwater is a real property right. 6 The
38. ASHLEY & SMmTH, supra note 3, at 39.
39. See Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in California:
Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657, 660 (1994); Benjamin R. Vance, Comment,
Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to Groundwater Protection, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 803, 804-805
(1996); GErCHES, supra note 16, at 246 (describing the increased costs of extracting water from
greater depths); Susan Batty Peterson, Designation and Protection of Critical Groundwater Areas, 1991
BYU L. Rev 1393, 1398 (1991); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Allocation and Protection: A United
States Case Study, EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES AND ISSUES 476, 488-489 (W.G. Emst ed., 2000);
Sandra Postel, When the World's Wells Run Dry, WORLD WATCH 30, 33 (Sept.-Oct. 1999) (describing
how increased pumping costs has driven some groundwater users to abandon pumping.).
40. Peterson, supra note 39, at 1395; Thompson, supra note 39, at 489.
41. Christopher B Amandes, Controlling Land Surface Subsidence. A Proposal for a Market
Based Regulatory Scheme, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1208, 1213 (1984).
42. State Water Resources Control Board, supra note 21; ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3,
at 40; TERRY L. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT 99 (The Johns Hopkins
University Press 1983).
43. Thompson, supra note 39, at 489; Deborah Moore and Zach Willey, Water in the
American West: Institutional Evolution and Environmental Restoration in the 2 1' Century, 62 U CoLO. L.
REv. 775, 776-780 (1991) (describing the environmental drought generally, without
distinguishing groundwater from surface water depletion).
44. ASHLEY & SMmTH, supra note 3, at 40; Peterson, supra note 39, at 1397; Thompson,
supra note 39, at 489.
45. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACcoUMTrNG OFIcE, WATER POLLON: MORE EMPHASis NEEDED ON
PREVENTION IN EPAs EFmRs TO IPRcTEC GROUNDWATER 13 (1991) (stating that "Ibloth EPA and the
states agree that the primary responsibility for protecting groundwater belongs to the states").
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state law pertaining to groundwater rights has largely developed through
common law, but the California Constitution and the California Water Code also
provide some limited directives.
I. Judge-Made Law
When California became a state in 1850, the Califomia legislature adopted
English common law and repealed all laws of Spanish and Mexican origin
governing the land except those stipulated in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. 7
Among the few rights they preserved were Pueblo water rights, which are the rights of
a municipal successor to a Spanish/Mexican pueblo to reasonable and beneficial
use of the water underlying the historic pueblo.4" Apart from Pueblo rights,
California courts followed English common law to adjudicate water disputes.49 As
such, courts initially applied the absolute ownership rule, giving landowners the right
to unlimited extraction of water beneath their land regardless of negative impacts
on neighboring groundwater users.5" The landowner's right to pump the water
beneath her land is called an overlying right.'
In the 1903 case of Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California Supreme Court
abandoned the doctrine of absolute ownership and imposed the correlative rights
46. Note that this is a usufructuary right, which means it is a right to use water, not an
ownership right in groundwater per se. ERIN SCHILLER & ELIZABETH FOWLER, ENDING
CAUFORNIA'S WATER CRISIs 33 (Pacific Research Institute 1999).
47. Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law: The Development of The California
Doctrine, 1850-1911, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162 (1998).
48. Scoff S. SLATR, CAuFoRL WATER LAw AND POUCY, Vol. 1, 5-3 (Butterworth Legal
Publishers 2001); sw also Kevin L. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of State Groundwater Laws, 30
TULsAL.I. 123, 140 n. 143 (1994) (for a description of their origin and cases addressing Pueblo rights).
49. English common law distinguishes surface water from groundwater. For surface water
disputes, courts applied the riparian principle that landowners who lived adjacent to surface water are
entitled to use it, and their rights are derived from their use of the water. Kanazawa, supra note 47, at 163.
The right "is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use." Id.
Courts later adopted a "no-injury' rule. The California Supreme Court explained that, "[a] riparian
proprietor, while he has the undoubted right to use the water flowing over his land, must use it as to do
the least possible harm to other riparian proprietors." Id. at 164 (quoting Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136,
141 (1857)). Then Califomia courts recognized a right of prior appropriation to surface water. Mark
Kanazawa argues that courts created prior appropriation rights to address gold miners' needs to divert
and use non-riparian water in California. Id. at 165. Subsequently the court grappled with employing a
riparian and appropriation system simultaneously for surface water, giving riparian owners priority and
the right to transfer their interests to appropriators. Id. at 168-172.
50. 62Cal.Jur.3d§394(1981).
51. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224 (2000) ("lAIn overlying right ...
is the owner's right to take water from the ground undemeath for use on his land within the basin or
watershed; the right is based on ownership of land and is appurtenant thereto.") (quoting California
Water Service Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, 224 Cal. App. 2d 715,725 (1964)).
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doctrine.52 Under this rule, overlying users hold in common the right to use the
groundwater for reasonable and beneficial use of the aquifer's safe yield." All
overlying landowners hold this right, irrespective of whether they withdraw
groundwater.54 Extracting up to the safe yield means removing only as much
water as will be recharged into the aquifer." If users withdraw more water than
the safe yield, then all overlying users must reduce their use to a fair and just
proportion relative to the other overlying users.6 When there is surplus water, it
may be appropriated by others who do not have overlying rights. 7
Besides Pueblo and overlying rights, the courts recognize two other types of
rights in groundwater usage. An appropriation right is the right to extract groundwater
surplus to that needed by overlying users and transport it to land that does not overlie
the groundwater basin from which it was extracted. To get appropriation rights, one
merely withdraws the surplus water and puts it to beneficial use.'9 A prescriptive right is
gained by pumping continuously for the prescription period when priof rights-holders
have notice and there is no surplus water in the basin.'
There are priorities between and among the rightholders. Pueblo rights
trump all other claims of use.6' The other three are prioritized as follows:
I Bletween overlying users, no temporal priority exists. Rather, in times of
shortage, each is entitled to a reasonable share of the common supply.
As between appropriators, temporal priority exists; the rights of a pumper
first in time are senior to those of a later appropriator. As between
overlying users and appropriators, overlying users have priority,
regardless of the date of the inception of the overlying use. Prescriptive
rights-holders can quantify their rights as against both prior appropriators
and overlying owners under formulas developed by the courts.62
52. LrITLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 21, at 49.
53. Katzv. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 144(1903).
54. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 45.
55. ANNE SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 99 (Governor's Comm'n to
Review Cal. Water Rights Law, Staff Paper No. 2. 1977).
56. Katz, 141 Cal.at 134-36;ANDERSON, supra note 42, at 97; 62 Cal. lur. 3d §401 (1981).
57. Katz, 141 Cal. at 135-36.
58. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 285.
59. SCHILLER& FOWLER, supra note 46, at 7-8.
60. To gain a presciptive right, use must be (1) reasonable and beneficial, (2) open and
notorious, (3) hostile and adverse, (4) continuous and uninterrupted for five years, and (5) exclusive
and under a daim of right. City of Los Angeles v. San Femando, 14 Cal. 3d 199,281-82 (1975).
61. SLATER, supra note 48, at 5-3.
62. Gregory S. Weber, Forging A More Coheent Gowuiter Pi*y in Ca*b=: State and FaMr
Cnsitolional Law ChallW to L"~ra Gmndmier ETrt RUticlons, 34 SANrACLARA L REv. 373, 375-76 (1994).
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In sum, the appropriator's use is limited to the amount of the surplus
water in the groundwater basin. If there is no surplus water, the appropriator is
not entitled to take any water, unless he has acquired prescriptive rights.3
Three key cases have further defined groundwater law in California. The
first arose after the Raymond Basin was overdrafted for more than twenty years.
In Pasadena v. Alhambra, the California Supreme Court imposed use limits to
reduce extraction to the basin's safe yield.' Rather than ascertain the overlying
and appropriative rights of each party, the Court reasoned that because the
basin had been overdrafted for so many years, all parties had developed
mutually prescriptive rights against all others and each must reduce their use
proportionate to the quantity they had acquired by prescription.6 ' The Court
determined the prescriptive quantity by looking at each pumper's annual
average extraction for the five years preceding the lawsuit.
After Pasadena v. Alhambra was decided in 1949, the mutual prescription
doctrine' facilitated negotiations because parties could calculate individual
extraction formulations based on recent use that became binding when
incorporated into the Court's judgment instead of grappling over figures based on
abstract overlying and appropriation rights.67 As one commentator noted, "[bly
agreeing to apply a formula, the parties have avoided adversary proceedings in
many situations where determination of complex appropriative priorities might in
any event be impossible because of the insufficient and unreliable data."'
Mutual prescription's utility declined, however, after City of Los Angeles v. City of
San Fernando. The California Supreme Court announced that the notice requirement
of prescriptive rights is not met simply by the lowering of the water table, despite the
Alhambra Court's finding that a lowered water table provides notice because it is
overdraft.69 The San Fernando Court redefined overdraft to be long term decline of the
63. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 926-27 (1949).
64. ld. at929.
65. Id. at 928-933.
66. The mutual prescription doctrine is the concept developed by the Pasadena Court that all
basin extractors can simultaneously establish prescriptive rights against one another when a basin is
overdrafted through the prescriptive statutory period because all pumpers have extracted water
contrary to the preexisting rights of one another for that period. Once extractors' rights are perceived
as mutually prescriptive, courts may determine individual extraction limits by looking at each
extractor's historical use during the prescriptive period. GErciEs, supra note 16, at 250.
67. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 23-24.
68. ASHLEY & SMrm-, supra note 3, at 46-47 (quoting MARYBEU.E D. ARcHIBALD, APPROPRiAnVE
WATrERR iHrsiNCAuFoRN]A 23-24 (Govemoes Comm'n to Review California Water Rights Law 1977).
69. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 282. ("The commencement of overdraft provides the
element of adversity which makes the first party's taking an invasion constituting a basis for
injunctive relief to the other party. But if the other party is not on notice that the overdraft
exists, such adverse taking does not cause the commencement of the prescriptive period.").
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water table, excluding natural fluctuations. 0  The court also declared that
prescriptive rights cannot be gained against public entities.7  So mutual
prescription does not exist when a public entity is party to an adjudication.72
The San Fernando Court also critiqued the equitable apportionment remedy
lower courts often employed after finding mutual prescription. The Court said,
"[al true equitable apportionment would take into account many more factors."73
In footnote 61, the Court noted that the United States Supreme Court equitably
apportioned water in Nebraska v. Wyoming, and further stated:
[alpportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding
principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of
water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the
practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a
limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They
are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue.74
The San Fernando Court's emphasis on ordering priorities when
determining equitable apportionment suggests that even when all parties to the
action are private individuals, a court cannot get around characterizing priorities
by finding mutual prescription.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed the groundwater priority rights system
in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency," unanimously holding that "although it is dear
that a trial court may impose a physical solution to achieve a practical allocation of
water to competing interests, the solution's general purpose cannot simply ignore the
priority rights of the parties asserting them."7 The court further directed that "a court
may neither change priorities among the water rights holders nor eliminate vested
rights in applying the solution without first considering them in relation to the
reasonable use doctrine. '7  In City of Barstow, the trial court had enforced a physical
solution that set an annual production limit for each party based on prior use with no
70. Id. at 280.
71. Id. at 270-77 (interpreting a 1968 amendment to California Civil Code § 1007 to
create a broad prohibition on obtaining prescription against water that is, in the words of
the statute, "dedicated to a public use.").
72. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 31-32.
73. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 265.
74. Id. at 265 n.61.
75. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224 (2000).
76. Id. at 1250.
77. Id. at 1237.
1222
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consideration for preexisting legal water rights.7 ' The trial court reasoned that "the
doctrine of reasonable and benefidal use, as established by Artide X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution, required an equitable apportionment of all rights when a basin is
in overdraft. '79 The Supreme Court disagreed, insisting that "Iclase law simply does not
support applying an equitable apportionment to water use claims unless all daimants
have correlative rights; for example, when parties establish mutual prescription. ' The
California Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's disposition that parties may
stipulate to a physical solution not based on their legal priorities if they agree to waive
their existing water rights,8 but the rights of non-stipulating parties are not affected by
the stipulated judgment.82 Prior use may still be a common method of resolving
disputes if parties stipulate to using it, but City of Barstow may slow pre-judgment
negotiation of water rights because parties will not be bound to commit to a physical
solution based on prior use unless mutual prescription has been established.83
2. California Statute-Based Law
In response to real and threatened depletion of water sources, the California
Constitution was amended in 1928 by citizen initiative.8 Article X, Section 2 declares
that "[tlhe right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or
water course in this state is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does and shall not extend
to the waste or unreasonable method of diversion." The amendment reinforces the
correlative rights doctrine's reasonable and beneficial use requirement.85
78. Id. at 1235-36.
79. Id. at 1238.
80. Id. at 1248.
81. Id. at 1256n.17.
82. Id. at 1253, 1256 (The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court
decision that the physical solution may bind stipulating parties, but the Cardozo appellants,
a non-stipulating party, still have their overlying rights protected.).
83. After this decision, a trial court may impose a physical solution based on prior use instead
of legal priorities, so long as it first finds that mutual prescription exists. After San Femando, in order to
find mutual prescription, the basin must be suffering from overdraft for at least five consecutive years
with notice to users and a public agency has not reserved a legal priority in the basin.
84. ASHLEY & SMrrH, supra note 3, at 45. The amendment was inspired by concerns for
surface water, but the California Supreme Court later held that it also applied to
groundwater. See, e.g., Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d. 351, 367 (1935).
85. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 77-78. judicial determinations of what is reasonable
and beneficial use varies. Whether or not a court restricts use may depend on the perceived
scarcity of water at the time of the suit. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore
Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567 (1935). Some courts give great weight to the "ever
increasing need for the conservation of water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite
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The California legislature has not yet defined property rights in
groundwater use. There is very little state law governing groundwater,'
California Water Code Section 2100 authorizes the State Water Resources
Control Board ("SWRCB") to police the use of water in the state, but does not
require it.8' The Water Code also gives the SWRCB power to referee
adjudication of groundwater rights and investigate matters pertaining to
adjudication of rights upon a court's request.8 In Imperial Irrigation District v. State
Water Resources Control Bd., a California Appellate Court found that SWRCB may
declare standards of reasonable use. 9
The legislature has also established groundwater extraction monitoring
requirements, but they only apply to four counties in the state.9" Individuals who
extract more than twenty-five acre-feet of water each year from any basin in Riverside,
San Bernardino, Los Angeles, or Ventura County must file a "Notice of Extraction and
Diversion of Water" with the SWRCB. 9' If an extractor does not file a notice of her
location and quantity of pumping, her use is not recognized under the law.9'
The legislature has passed many bills to facilitate local groundwater
management. For example, the California Water Code includes a number of
special district acts. Each act creates a specific geographic groundwater
management district with enumerated functions.93 The legislature authorizes
special districts to perform an array of functions, such as determining
groundwater capacity, managing flow in and out of its basins, setting quotas for
use when the basins are overdrafted, and prosecuting unreasonable users.94 The
legislature has also authorized various types of water districts (agencies), which
may levy taxes, issue bonds, set service rates, and participate in litigation
apart from its express recognition in the 1928 amendment." Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water
Dist., 67 Cal. 2d. 132, 140 (1967).
86. There are a few state statutes addressing groundwater contamination, but they
will not be addressed here as groundwater quality is beyond the scope of this paper.
87. The SWRCB can initiate a basin adjudication to prevent destruction or
irreparable injury to groundwater quality. CAL. WATER CODE § 2100 (Deering 2001).
88. CAL. WATER CODE § 2000 (Deering 2001).
89. 225 CaI.App. 3d 548, 561 (1990).
90. See CAL. WATER CODE § 4999-5008 (Deering 2001).
91. Id. at §§ 4999, 5001.
92. Id. at § 5004. The statute imposes no other penalties, except that under § 5003
the extractor cannot gain a prescription right against others.
93. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE App. §§ 118-101 to 118-901 established the Monterey
Peninsula Water Management District in Monterey County. For a list of other specific
districts, see Eric L. Garner, Michelle Ouellette, and Richard L. Sharff, Jr., Institutional Reforms in
California Groundwater Law, 25 PAc. L.I. 1021, 1033 n.114 (1994).
94. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27,at 291-293.
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affecting users in their jurisdiction. 5 Assembly Bill 3030 grants these local
agencies the right to adopt groundwater management plans, but not the right to
make binding determinations of individuals' water rights." Approximately 150
agencies have adopted groundwater management plans pursuant to AB 3030.9'
Cities and counties may use their police power to regulate groundwater by
ordinance as long as there is no conflict with state law. s About 30% of
California's counties adopted groundwater ordinances, usually requiring a
conditional use permit before water can be exported from the county of origin.'
E. Groundwater Basin Adjudication In Practice
Competing rights for groundwater are generally not adjudicated until after a
groundwater basin becomes overdrafted. A senior appropriator or overlying right-holder
typically brings an action against a junior appropriator, seeking an injunction to halt the
junior appropriator's use. To set the order of priority, the court must then characterize
each extractor's use. "One product of the adjudication is judicial determination of the
nature and quantity of each groundwater user's share of the basin's safe yield,"'00
After rights are adjudicated, the court typically appoints a watermaster, who
then manages the quantity of water in the basin. The court may give the watermaster
authority to devise methods to prevent overdraft, and the watermaster may petition to
have other responsibilities, such as oversight of water quality. The court usually
reserves the right to review its order when conditions change."' Sixteen groundwater
basins in California have been.adjudicated.'
95. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 43; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives
on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REv. 673, 697 n.80 (1993) (providing a list of sources that
discuss success of these districts); see also CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER REsouRcES
BULLETIN No. 155-94, GENERAL COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA WATER DIsTRICT AcTs (1994) (list of all
general and special districts created by the California legislature).
96. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10750-10755.4 (West 2001) (for terms of groundwater
management plans); see also Gamer, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1032. Section 10753.8(b)
does not authorize agendes to make binding determinations of individual users' rights.
97. GovERNOR's ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, supra note 11, at 2-7; see also
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURcES, GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORN- A
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 9-11 (1999).
98. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 31 Cal. App. 4th 166, 175 (1994).
99. GOVERNOR'S ADvISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, supra note 11, at 2-7.
100. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 286.
101. Id. at 289.
102. In order of final court adjudication, these basins are: 1944 Raymond Basin, 1958
Cucamonga Basin, 1961 West Coast Basin; 1965 Central Basin; 1966 Santa Margarita River
Watershed; 1969 San Bemardino Basin; 1972 Cummings Basin; 1973 Tehachapi Basin; 1973 Main
San Gabriel Basin; 1977 Warren Valley Basin; 1978 Chino Basin; 1979 Upper Los Angeles River Area;
1980 Scott River System; 1985 Puente; 1996 Santa Paula Basin, and 1998 Mojave Basin. See Ronald
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Adjudication of all four basins in the San Gabriel watershed illustrates how the
process of arriving at effective management varies. (1) The Raymond Basin is
governed by adjudication from the famous San Fernando case discussed supra, Part
I.D. 1. Assigned pumping rights limit the amount of extraction to safe yield. However,
the maximum annual extraction figure was adjusted once because the original
estimate of safe yield was too low." 3 A board serves as the watermaster to monitor
pumping and the basin's condition. Water producers bear the costs of administering
this system.'0 4 (2) Initially, a water district tried to manage the West Basin without first
adjudicating individuals' extraction rights."' When that failed, water users sought to
clarify their rights via adjudication.'16 Now a California Department of Resources field
office serves as the basin watermaster and assures that the West Basin is artificially
replenished' 7 because the rights assigned exceed the natural safe yield. However,
pumpers pay taxes to cover these services.0 8  (3) The Central Basin was also
adjudicated after a water district could not solve overdraft problems. The Central
Basin is currently managed and replenished much like the West Basin."°9 (4) Similarly,
a water district was first created for the Main San Gabriel Basin, and eventually rights
were adjudicated."' The basin's safe yield is set each year and each party is entitled to
extract a share of the safe yield. Overpumping is taxed and that revenue is used to
purchase water to replenish the basin."'
Part 11
A. Why Adjudication?
Overdraft and depletion can be prevented by controlling extraction from
the groundwater basin. But how can extraction be checked when it is unclear
who has a right to withdraw water? The current system of groundwater law is
Kaiser, De Trouble Options for Managing The Hidden Thrat of Aquer Depletion in Teas, 32 Th. TECH L. REV.
249,280 n. 159 (2001). The Mojave Basin is not on this list since appealing groundwater users are not
bound by the stipulated judgment of the lower court.
103. William Blomquist, Institutions for Managing Groundwater Basins in Southern California,
WATER OUANTTY/OuALn'Y MANAGEMENT AND CONFLIcr RESOLUTION 43, 46 (Ariel Dinar and Edna
Tusak Loehman eds., Praeger Publishers 1995).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County's judgment. California Water Service Co. v. Edward Sidebotharn & Son, Inc., 224 Cal.
App. 2d 715 (1964).
107. Artificial replenishment entails importing surface water to spreading basins to
percolate into the aquifer beneath.
108. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 46-47.
109. Id. at47.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id.
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fraught with uncertainty.'". The California Supreme Court warned that
uncertainty "inhibits long range planning and investment for the development
and use of waters .... The California legislature declared that "the efficient
use of water requires certainty in the definition of property rights to the use of
water.""' 4  As one author noted, "Iclurrently, groundwater users have very
uncertain ideas of what their respective rights are if the basin has not been
adjudicated. The state of the law prevents fulfillment of the constitutional
requirement that water be put to reasonable and beneficial use.""5
For a number of reasons, it is imperative that adjudication of user rights be
the first major groundwater law reform. First, the past sixty years of institutional
experimentation in California demonstrate that adjudication is the necessary first
step toward groundwater management. Only the rights-adjudicated basins in
California are effectively managed. Second, groundwater is a commons problem
that can only be solved by a private entitlement system. Third, public-private
partnerships for conjunctive use and private markets in water rights are unlikely to
be sustainable practices until groundwater ownership is clearly defined.
The fact that all sustainable management schemes in California today
came about only after rights to use the groundwater were adjudicated suggests
that adjudication is the imperative first step to accomplishing a long-term
management scheme. Although the Orange County Water District ("OCWD") is
often cited as an institutional solution to overdraft without adjudication,' 6
because OCWD's management practices are not sustainable, it is not a model
for developing a management structure. Orange County created a water district
in 1933"7 that required every extractor to register with the OCWD." 8 The district
then began monitoring all pumping and imposing a tax on withdrawals to fund
artificial replenishment. There is no set pumping limit for users."9 The OCWD
112. Gamer, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1028.
113. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 355 (1979).
114. CAL. WATERCODE§ 1011.5(a) (Deering 2001).
115. Michael P. Mallery, Groundwater. A Call for a Comprehensive Management Program, 14
PAc. L.J. 1279, 1290 (1983).
116. Susan M. Trager, Emerging Forums for Groundwater Dispute Resolution in California: A
Glimpse at- the Second Generation of Groundwater Issues and How Agencies Work Towards Problem
Resolution, 20 PAc. L.I. 31, 63-64 (1988); ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 44.
117. CAL. UNCOD. WATER Acrs, Act 5683 (1933 Cal. Stat. 924). Although it was
originally created in 1933, the district was substantially altered by an amendment in 1953
that authorized the OCWD to operate a replenishment program and impose pumping taxes
within its jurisdiction. 1953 Cal. Stat. 770.
118. Id. at §24.
119. Two commentators have pointed out that the OCWD approach ignores pre-existing
priorities, thereby eliminating any advantage of having a pre-existing right in the basin
groundwater. Nonetheless, the court dismissed all possible constitutional claims resulting from
this deprivation in Orange County Water District v. Fransworth, 138 Cal. App. 2d 518 (1956), wherein it
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prevents overdrafting by periodically measuring total extraction and artificially
replenishing the basin to compensate for that loss. This system is not a
sustainable method of preventing overdraft since it relies entirely on artificial
recharge by imported surface water from the Colorado River and the Northern
California State Project.'20 The OCWD arrangement is also flawed because,
absent defined and transferable pumping rights, users have no incentive to
move from lesser to higher valued uses.2
Groundwater depletion is a "tragedy of the commons." "Groundwater is a
fugitive resource that is valuable only when it is captured; and we can expect
groundwater basins to be overexploited, like buffalo or. whales.., 22 Rational
pumpers using the resource believe that continuing to withdraw groundwater is
in their best interest, even when extraction exceeds natural basin replenishment
(thereby resulting in long-term overdraft and all of its consequences).
Removing an additional unit of water is perceived as a greater benefit than the
individual cost resulting from a slightly lowered water table.'23 "Therein is the
tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his
lusel ... without limit - in a world that is limited."' 
24
A private property system can overcome the tragedy of the groundwater commons
because it can internalize the extemalities, both positive and negative, of extracting
groundwater.' 2' On the most fundamental level, water users will not be able to extract
groundwater that someone else owns.126 In addition, "[wlhen the effects of resource use
upheld the OCWD management method. See George G. Grover & John F. Mann, Jr., Acton v.
Blundell Revisisted: "Property" in Cafornia Groundwater, 18W. ST. U. L. REV. 589,596 (1991).
120. See Paula K. Smith, Coercion and Groundwater Management: Three Case Studies and a
"Market" Approach, 16 ENVrL. L. 797, 833 (1986).
121. WILLiAM BLOMoUIST, DIVIDINGTHEWATERS 270 (ICS Press 1992). See also Blomquist,
supra note 103, at 57 (the author argues that making allocations specific and transferable
allows for smooth adjustments in water use).
122. Anderson, supra note 42, at 101.
123. Mallery, supra note 115, at 1285; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragica/y Diut: The Obstads to
Governing the Commons, 30 Ervn. L 241, 250 (2000) ("Unfortunately, groundwater is ... a natural
commons. Absent legal constraints, each user has an incentive to pump as much as he or she needs,
even when the cumulative result is a rapid depletion or overdrafting of the groundwater aquifer.").
124. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162SCIENCE 1243, 1244(1968).
125. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 348
(1967) ("A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a
greater internalization of externalities."); Anderson, supra note 42, at 110 ("As the scarcity of
surface water and groundwater increases, privatizing the commons offers the best hope of
getting the highest value from these resources.").
126. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 36.
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are fairly localized, private property better aligns each owner's interests with the efficient
level of use because each owner faces the full costs of overconsumption."' 
27
But to create a private property system in groundwater, "the sovereign needs
identifiable units of property, just as the holders of those units need sovereign activity,
if renewable resources such as groundwater are to continue their renewability.' 28 The
OCWD management strategy mentioned above, which was not premised on
adjudication of rights, has not resolved the "tragedy of the commons" because users
do not have ownership shares that would give them incentives to keep the basin's
water supply sustainable. "[Elven if each pumper pays her pro rata share of the
increased costs, each continues to have an incentive to go on pumping. The solution
is therefore not just to impose the increased costs of pumping on all pumpers pro
rata, but to reduce total pumping."'29 In order to enforce pro rata reductions when
overdraft is occurring, Califomia's groundwater law must clarify all claims of
usufructuary rights to the groundwater. 3 '
Following the "reasonable and beneficial use" mandate of the California
Constitution, 3' only rights to proportionate use should be determined by
adjudication. Allocating absolute rights will only exacerbate the groundwater
commons tragedy. According to one author:
Property rights can help solve the tragedy of the commons when the
rights result in the effective internalization of the cost of excessive
harvesting, but property rights turn harmful when they reinforce a sense
of entitlement to an unlimited harvest . .. ITIhey ... can . . . cause
resource users, as a matter of fairness, to reject out of hand even the
suggestion that they should reduce their current usage ... Moreover,
property rights may focus resource users on their individual interests
rather than on total societal well being, undermining social norms of
cooperation and reinforcing the very dichotomy between individual and
social welfare that underlies the tragedy of the commons.'32
127. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621,678 (1998).
128. Earl F. Murphy, Some Legal Solutions for Contemporary Problems Concerning Groundwater
and Aquifers, 4 1. MIN. L. & POL'Y 49, 111 (1988).
129. Smith, supra note 120, at 810-11. Smith points out other problems with the
system, namely that users are not paying the entire replacement cost since the surface water
obtained for replenishment is subsidized by the state and federal governments and many
users are exempt or paying discounted replenishment and equity fees. Id. at 841.
130. Id. at 873-74 ("some kind of allocation is required, regardless of what the other
groundwater management scheme components ... may be...").
131. CAL.CONsr.artX,§2.
132. Thompson, supra note 123, at 257.
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There should be no misunderstanding about the proportionate nature of
rights when they are adjudicated.
In addition, ascertaining proportionate ownership in each basin is a logical
prerequisite to commencing markets in water rights and allowing private individuals
to make conjunctive use arrangements. Groundwater experts have long insisted that
groundwater banking not begin until rights have been clarified.'33 But these pleas
have been in vain, as at least twelve conjunctive use projects are already operating in
California.'34 The California Department of Water Resources counts on availability of
these arrangements to meet the state's demand for water.'35
Conjunctive use in non-adjudicated and non-monitored basins is risky because
the uncertainty in property rights presents a loophole for wrongdoers to act and evade
responsibility. For example, who will be liable if water quality deteriorates as a result
of a conjunctive use arrangement?'36 Who will be liable if too much water is stored
and flooding results? How can non-contracting parties be sure that adequate room
will be reserved for naturally recharging water to percolate into the basin for those who
claim rights in percolating basin water but not in the artificially imported water?.'37
How will contracting parties prevent non-contracting parties from using water that
"belongs" to the contracting parties?'38 Unfortunately, those desiring to initiate
conjunctive use arrangements are unable to incorporate all users into the agreement
to avoid these potential disputes because user rights have not been established.
In the past five years, government agents and a private company, Cadiz, have
conducted numerous studies regarding one such proposed conjunctive use and water
marketing arrangement involving groundwater beneath the Mojave Desert.'39 The
Mojave Desert overlies nine groundwater basins'40 containing 20 million acre-feet of
133. James H. Krieger and Havey 0. Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CAL. L.
REV. 56, 69 (1962) ('The use of groundwater storage for imported water cannot be
completely successful unless the natural local water supply has been fully adjudicated so
that extractions can be controlled and the basin fully managed.").
134. EDELLA SCHLAGER & WILLIAM BLomOuIsT, 1998 PROGRESS REPORT: A COMPAPATVE
INsTITuTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONJUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT PRACncES AMONG THREE SOUTHWESTERN
STATES (Environmental Protection Agency, National Center for Environmental Research), at
http://es.epa.gov/ncer/progress/grants/95/water/schlager 98.html (Dec. 19, 2000).
135. The Department notes that "Iwlater users in the Central Valley, Bay Area, and
Southem California having access to major regional conveyance facilities have ...
opportunities to rely on water marketing arrangements and conjunctive use options..
CAuFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES5- 11.
136. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 298.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See infra note 161.
140. Upper, Middle and Lower Mojave. River, Harper, Coyote, Caves, Cronise Valley,
Soda, and Silver Lake basins.
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water within a 1300 square mile watershed.4 Because the annual recharge rate is low,
experts believe that the immense quantity of water now underlying the desert
percolated over thousands of years.'42 In 1990 in the northwestern comer of the
watershed, the City of Barstow sued upstream pumpers, alleging that they overdrafted
the groundwater basin. 43 The Mojave Water Agency cross-complained for an
adjudication of water rights in the watershed. 44 Non-stipulating parties appealed the
physical solution to the California Supreme Court, which resulted in the City of Barstow
v. Mojave Water Agency decision described supra, Part I.D. 1. Users who did not stipulate
to the judgment are not bound to limit their extractions to comport with the safe yield
equation calculated by stipulating parties.'4' Thus, the future of groundwater in the
northwestern comer remains at risk
East of the groundwater basins at issue in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency,
the groundwater beneath the Cadiz and Fenner Valleys is also at risk Here, too,
groundwater rights have not been adjudicated. Nonetheless, Cadiz would like to sell
and store water in the basin underlying its 27,000 acres in a 50 year contract with the
MWD. 46 The MWD has considered contracting with Cadiz to jointly construct a 35-
mile pipeline from a 390 acre man-made basin on the Cadiz property to the MWD's
Colorado River Aqueduct. 47 Under the terms of the proposed agreement, the MWD
would be bound to buy at least 30,000 acre-feet of native groundwater each year for
the first twenty-five years of the contract, and could elect to purchase an additional
30,000 acre-feet per year during that period. 48 In addition, the MWD could pump up
to 150,000 acre-feet per year of Colorado River water into the aquifer during wet years,
and withdraw that water during dry years.1
49
Five federal wilderness areas and Joshua Tree National Park surround Cadiz's
property. Under the implied reservation doctrine, the United States has the right to
141. METROPOLrTAN WATER DIsTRIcr, ABOUT THE PROPOSED CADIZ PROGRAM, at
httpiJ/mwd dst.ca.us/mwdh2o.data/site%20trash/aboutcadizO1.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
142. Blomquist, supra note 121, at41.
143. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 96, at 1045.
144. id.
145. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1253, 1256 (2000).
146. CADIZ, INC., THE CADIZ GROUNDWATER STORAGE AND DRY-YEAR SUPPLY PROGRAM, at
http:/Avww.cadizinc.conc/pdf/Q&A%20page I .pdf.
147. MEnRoPOLrrAN WATER DbIjc, ABOUTTHE PRoPOsEDCADI zPROGRAM, supra note 141; se a&)
M norourAN WATER Dsnar & BUREAU OF LAND MANACEMENr, FINAL ENVIRONME rAL IMPACT REFORF/
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATFvENE C GROUNDWATER STORAGE AND DRY-YEAR SUPPLY PROGRAM. SAN
BERNARiNoCOUMNY, CAURN at http-/ww.mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh2oapagesn ews/cadimet/indexhtm.
148. SUMMARY OF METROPOLTAN/CADIZ ECONOMIC TERMS (March 6, 2001) available at
httpJAvww.mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh2o/pdf/news/Cadizsummary0 I.PDF.
149. METROPOLITAN WATER DIsTR cr, supra note 141.
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water that originates on or beneath reserved parkland'5 ° as needed to fulfill the
purpose of reserving the land."' It follows that the federal government may claim
rights to the groundwater beneath Joshua Tree National Park as needed to sustain
the park in its current condition, assuming the land was reserved for purposes of
conserving the natural ecosystem. For non-reserved federal land, which includes the
five wilderness areas, the federal government is likely to defer to state law to
determine how its water rights will be determined." 2 Unfortunately, California's
common law system of ambiguous usufructory rights does not protect the public
interest in maintaining the water table at its current level, thereby assuring stability
of the desert ecosystem. Conserving the desert ecosystem requires adjudication of
public and private rights to water use to guarantee that Cadiz' project will not extract
water needed to sustain the desert flora and fauna.53
At least for the short-term, the MWD has laid concerns about the Mojave
Desert ecosystem to rest with a narrowly approved board vote on October 8,
2002 to cancel the Cadiz project.'54 After the parties involved spent nearly five
years conducting environmental studies, the MWD voted in the eleventh hour to
forego the binding contract and the Cadiz Groundwater Storage and Dry-Year
Supply Program.'55 The project is allegedly "the only California-based storage
and supply project to receive all of its federal environmental approvals."'5 6
However, the MWD board members cited various reasons for rejecting the
project, including (1) concern that environmental questions have not yet been
150. W. Douglas Karl, Note, Groundwater Rights on Public Land in California, 35 HASTiNGs L.J. 1007,
1010 (1984). ('When the federal government reserves land [e.g. national parks] ... it often expressly
or impliedly reserves the water rights necessary to carry out the purposes of the land reservation.").
151. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 18.:
152. Kari, supra note 150, at 1022. California recognizes appropriation rights to
groundwater beneath public land. Id. at 1027.
153. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 33 (suggesting that when water is needed
for environmental protection, title to the water should be given to the public agency with
that responsibility).
154. The motion to cancel the project required a 50% vote of support to pass, and
the motion garnered 50.25% of the MWD board's weighted votes. Michael A. Hiltzik, MWD
Cancels Desert Storage Project, L.A. TiMES, October 9, 2002, at B6.
155. Resources: The Stakes are High-Financially and Politically-For the Santa Monica
Company and its Proposed Partner, the Metropolitan Water District, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2002, at B3.
156. Metropolitan Water District Votes on Cadiz Program; Board Rejects Terms and Conditions of Federal
Right-of-Way Grant, Bus. WIRE, October 8, 2002. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the
project will not hurt flora and fauna; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency found that it
complies with the Clean Air Act and will not adversely impact the area's air quality; and the
Department of Interior granted a Record of Decision in August, 2002, for a right-of-way through
federal wilderness land after the Bureau of Land Management worked with the U.S. Geological
Survey and National Park Service to affirm the program's viability. Cadiz Program Reoxivt Final Federal!
Environmental Approvd; U.S. Department of the Interior Issues Record of Desion, Bus. WIRE, August 29. 2002.
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answered, (2) doubt about Cadiz' financial stability as a business partner, and
(3) uncertainty over the availability of excess Colorado River water in coming
years necessary to make the conjunctive use project worthwhile.' 7 The MWD
has yet to certify the Final Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact
Statement and sign final contracts with Cadiz." 8
However, the Cadiz project may not be entirely derelict, as Cadiz has stated that
it intends to continue pursuing the project and believes that the MWD is bound to
move forward."9 The MWD's decision to forestall a conjunctive use project in Mojave
gives policymakers an opportunity to protect the desert ecosystem and assure
responsible groundwater harvesting by adjudicating public and private rights to water
use before arranging for widespread water extraction.
B. Why Opt for a New System of Adjudication Imposed at the
State Level?
In 1978, the Governor's Commission, recognizing that California's
groundwater is inadequately protected by law, "6 recommended a new system of
adjudication imposed at the state level. '"' But narrow interest groups stymied
policy-makers and groundwa"ter reform efforts drowned. In the twenty-five years
since, the groundwater situation has not improved and the state is still better
positioned than local governments, in terms of resources and authority, to
clarify rights in groundwater use.162 Part II.A, supra, demonstrated that clarifying
property rights in groundwater via adjudication is imperative. This section
illustrates why a new system of adjudication is necessary and why it must be
imposed systematically at the state level.
The current adjudicatory system has numerous flaws. First and foremost,
individuals have no incentive to sue until a basin is overdrafted. 3 The common law
correlative rights doctrine" is partly to blame because the law does not restrict the
157. Hiltzik, supra note 154.
158. Cadiz Program Receives Final Federal Environmental Approval, supra note 156.
159. Metropolitan Water District Votes on Cadiz Program; Board Rejects Terms and Conditions of
Federal Right-of-Way Grant, supra note 156.
160. CALIFORNIA GOvERNOR'S COMM'N To REviEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL
REPORT 136 (1978).
161. The Commission recommended dividing the state into management areas for
individual governance by a local groundwater management authority who may seek
adjudication of rights if management is not otherwise adequate. Id. at 168-69; Deborah A.
de Lambert, District Management for California's Groundwater, II EcOLOGY L.Q. 373, 394 (1984);
Zachary A. Smith, Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and Prerequisites to Reform, 20
CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 240-41 (1984); Mallery, supra note 115, at 1298.
162. Gamer, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1050.
163. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289; De Lambert, supra note 161, at 389.
164. For an explanation of the correlative rights doctrine, see supra Part I.D. I.
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overlying owner's share until the basin is overdrafted. So groundwater "law" does not
check water use until damage to the basin has already occurred.'6 Second, litigants
have trouble ascertaining all the proper parties through the traditional judicial
process.'6 Third, parties have little incentive to reach stipulated judgments since
those who do not agree are not bound to the physical solution and can litigate their
claims." 7 Fourth, adjudication is lengthy and expensive, and appeals often delay trial
courts' stipulated judgments from becoming effective for many years." Fifth, judges
impose physical solutions at one point in time, but may not engineer them to account
for changes in hydrologic conditions and human impact on water sources.' 9 Sixth,
since a court cannot address an issue until a party raises it, the standard judicial
system is not the ideal forum for effecting reform.'
Nonetheless, adjudication affords groundwater users many benefits. First,
adjudication makes users' ownership interests certain and definite. Second, when an
extractor quits pumping, he can sell or lease his right, instead of just forfeiting it.7'
Third, judges can tailor remedies to the unique attributes of the basins and their
users."' One scholar points out that:
lIt] is important to recognize . . .that the difficulties encountered by
groundwater users in any given location will depend in large measure on the
properties of the basin on which they rely ... The attomeys recognize and
write about how much the physical characteristics of groundwater basins
differ, and how much those specific differences matter, while engineers often
165. Mallery, supra note 115, at 1284.
166. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 390.
167. The California Supreme Court created this negative incentive when the panel,
held in City of Barstow that parties' rights will not be affected (unless mutual prescription has
been established) if they refuse to sign the stipulated judgment. City of Barstow v. Mojave
WaterAgency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1253, 1256 (2000).
168. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 389; Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289. For
example, the Central Basin (under San Gabriel River) adjudication cost $585k (in 1965
dollars) and lasted six and years. Blomquist, supra note 121, at 141. Adjudication of the
West Basin underlying western Los Angeles dragged on for 16 years. Id. at 106. The
Tehachapi-Cummings suit took nine years. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 389 n.106.
Adjudicating the basin at issue in San Fernando took twenty years. Id.
169. Trager, supra note 116, at 61.
170. Sometimes parties assume an issue has been resolved when it has not even been
addressed. For example, apparently no one was aware that public entities had immunity from
mutual prescription based on an amendment to Civil Code § 1007 until the issue came before the
Califomia Supreme Court in San Fernando. Blomquist, supra note 121, at 216.
171. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 55.
172. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289.
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observe how much the legal, economic, and political circumstances of
groundwater basins differ, and how much these specific differences matter.'73
The state has authority and resources to impose effective adjudication, whereas
local entities do not.'74 The state legislature has long reserved the right to regulate
groundwater to benefit and protect the public. 7' Because groundwater moves within a
basin, groundwater management can only be effective when employed across the
entire basin. In most instances, local entities cannot accomplish this task because
jurisdictional boundaries do not comport with basin boundaries. The state is also
better situated to provide funding and enforce regulations,7 " as the costs of managing
groundwater basins can be spread across all water consumers in the state.
Part III
A. The Proposal
The state legislature must pass groundwater reform legislation. The new
legislation, the Groundwater Rights Clarification Act ("GRCA"), should go
beyond the 1978 Governor's Commission recommendations, which offered
adjudication as an option for local management authorities. GRCA should create
an adjudicatory process to determine the use rights to all groundwater in
California, exempting only the sixteen basins already adjudicated.
The Groundwater Rights Clarification Act should contain the following elements.
First, the state will be divided into management areas that follow the boundaries of
natural basins. Second, each basin will have its own management authority (the
"Authority'). Third, all basin extractors will be required to register with the Authority. 17
Fourth, the Authority will meter all extractions and keep pumping logs of the entire
basin. The Authority will ascertain the basin's safe yield (if this is not already known) and
assess whether the basin is overdrafted.77 Fifth, the Authority will file a suit to adjudicate
groundwater user rights in its jurisdiction. judges with special expertise in groundwater
173. Blomquist, supra note 121, at 24, 25.
174. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1050.
175. CAL. WATER CODE § 104, 105 (Deering 2001); see also CAL. WATER CODE § 12922
(Deering 2001) (declaring the public interest in protecting groundwater basins from
"overdraft, depletion, sea water intrusion or degraded water quality.").
176. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1050.
177. The Recordation Act already requires this of all users in four Southem California
counties. CAL. WATER CODE § 4999- 5008 (Deering 2001).
178. The Governors Advisory Drought Planning Panel observes that, "[tlhe lack of availability of
groundwater data in various areas of the State... Iis al significant impediment to fostering cxxperative
local and regional solutions to water management needs ... the availability of groundwater hydrologic
data in California lags behind that of surface water data, in part because of the inherent nature of the
resource and to the absence of a statewide system of permitting and reporting groundwater
extractions." GoiE R'sAursmDRouGTrrrRNNq G PANE, supra note 11, at 4-9.
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law will adjudicate the rights of each basin, taking into account claimed priorities and
prior use.'79 The equitable apportionment test mentioned in footnote 61 of the San
Fernando case, quoted supra Part lID. 1, lists factors the judges should consider."' GRCA
will dictate how to determine necessary parties, select the judges, limit venue, fulfill
requirements of notice, set parameters of discovery, and pre-ordain the use and effect of
the stipulated judgments. 8
GRCA will clarify the rights of all current and potential users. 82 Civil Code
§ 1007 must be amended to leave no doubt that municipalities' water claims
can (and will) be incorporated into the basin adjudication. 83 Adjudication will
assign shares for the "right to extract" to each pumper. These rights will be
expressed as a percentage of total basin extraction. The right will be identified
in relation to the rights of others, and:
[Aillocation should be limited to the natural and artificial recharge amount
but should indude enough flexibility in the same time span selected to allow
pumping more than annual recharge in some dry years and to allow storage
for replenishment in wet years .... [S]ome reduction inthe allocation may be
required on a pro rata basis in order to restrict withdrawal to safe yield. These
reductions should be set out in terms of reducing a percentage of
accumulated overdraft over a period in which withdrawal and recharge can be
balanced and should leave the aquifer with adequate storage room. This
179. Adjudicating rights based on prior use runs the risk that that users who know
this in advance will "race to the pumphouse." Blomquist, supra note 121, at 353; Gamer,
Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1026. It is unclear how this phenomenon can be
avoided entirely. Since the judges will consider other factors besides prior use, perhaps
extractors will doubt the efficacy of racing to the pumphouse.
180. However, the judges must consider common law overlying rights and prescriptive
priorities as well. In City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency the Califomia Supreme Court stated that
footnote 61 is not "precedent for wholly disregarding the priorities of existing water rights in favor of
equitable apportionment... [Wle have never endorsed a pure equitable apportionment that
completely disregards owners' existing legal rights." 23 Cal. 4th 1224,1247-1248 (2000).
181. The Governor's Commission proposed these streamlining procedures in 1978.
See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N To REvIEw CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAw, supra note 160; De
Lambert, supra note 161, at 395-396.
182. Because the common law does not require overlying owners to extract
groundwater to maintain their rights to it, 62 Cal. lur. 3d § 398 (1981), the Authorities will
name all overlying landowners as parties and the judges will determine overlying owners'
proportion of current and potential use.
183. To work with the existing common law framework and bring all extractors to the
table, arguably mutual prescription must be applicable to municipal groundwater
extractors. Because the San Fernando court interpreted Civil Code § 1007 to immunize
municipal extractors from prescriptive claims, Civil Code § 1007 should be amended to
clarify that prescriptive rights can be gained against municipal extractors. See supra, Part I.D. 1
for a discussion of the San Fernando Court's modification of the mutual prescription doctrine.
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should be made explicit in the original statute to reduce uncertainty about
how reductions will be made.'1
After usufructuary rights are adjudicated, the basin authority may assess
pumping taxes, stipulate proportionate reductions when necessary to prevent
overdrafting, and facilitate conjunctive use projects. Since the statute creates
defined yet flexible water allocations, the Authority can choose management
strategies that are appropriate to the particular characteristics of its basin.'85
Local efforts that contradict adjudication will be preempted by the state statute.
There are currently a number of local groundwater management programs in the state.
"Ilin Califomia Water Code sections 1220 and 10753, the Legislature has authorized
certain counties to enact groundwater management plans. Section 1220 expressly
and exclusively applies to counties. Section 10753 applies only to counties that meet
its specific requirements. In combination, however, these two statutes greatly expand
the express power of counties to control groundwater exports.,186 But the California
Constitution, Article X1, Section 7 only allows a city or county to make and enforce
local ordinances "not in conflict with general laws."' 7 Therefore, locally devised
attempts to control groundwater will be ineffective to the extent they interfere with the
state-mandated adjudication.
B. Why This Approach Can Work
This proposal does not constitute a massive upheaval of current rights in
property, and it will not result in the taking of private property.' Rights created by the
common law system are not extinguished by this arrangement. Following the
California Supreme Court's holding in City of Barstow, priorities will not be ignored, but
other considerations will also be relevant. This proposal is pragmatic, recognizing that
adjudicating rights based on priority alone is not feasible.'89 The state-imposed
transition of surface water rights to a permitting scheme from a riparian/appropriation
scheme demonstrates that it is possible to re-characterize rights of water use without
actually taking the rights to use water.9 °
Furthermore, learning from the lessons of the past, the proposal can be pitched to
gamer support, or at least avoid opposition, of the farming lobby that defeated the
184. Smith, supra note 161,at 875.
185. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 53-54.
186. Weber, supra note 62, at 380.
187. CAL. CONS. Art XI § 7.
188. CAL. CONsT. Art I § 19 (West 2002) ("Private property may be taken or damaged
for public use only when just compensation ... has first been paid...").
189. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1235 (2000) ("The
Itriall court... concluded that allocating water based on asserted legal priorities would be
'extremely difficult, if not impossible."').
190. See, e.g., Mallery, supra note 115, at 1304 n.295.
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groundwater rights reform efforts of 1978-1981. "' A number of scholars have attempted to
ascertain the impetus of the lobby, comprised of the California Cattlemen's Association,
California Chamber of Commerce, California Farm Bureau and the Association of California
Water Agencies (collectively referred to herein as the "farming lobby').' 92 Some believe that
the farming lobby was motivated by a fear of losing local control to a centralized
administration and/or of losing individual rights (present and future) to extract
groundwater.'93 Various members of the farming lobby were optimistic that surface waters
could offset overdrafts, negating the need for groundwater management reform.'94 One
study revealed that in California and other states that have proposed groundwater reform
bills, some bills passed and others were denied, not because of opposition/support for
central administration per se, but because of sentiment about the particular administration
in power at the time these bills were proposed. 9'
The farming lobby must be convinced that the state will not deny them rights or
control, but .give them more rights and control. The state will not impose particular
management strategies, but only require darification of usufructuary rights. The system
will better serve current rights claimants because it will minimize future litigation by
making the law more certain and rights more specific Claimants will be guaranteed
rights now so that others cannot gain prescriptive rights against them later. In addition,
authorities of adjudicated basins may import surface water to maintain the water table
and prevent overdrafting, keeping the availability of water at the status quo.
' 9
6
Part IV
We know too much about the science of groundwater, the effects of overdrafting
and the projected water demands of our booming population to be satisfied with a
system that ignores these facts and promises only uncertainty. Instead of following
laws premised on reality, we have a system resting on the fiction that groundwater is
an unlimited commons. It is "perhaps best summarized as the right to pump as much
191. Smith, supra note 161, at 242, 246-50 (suggesting that agricultural groups
succeeded in opposing legislation and defeated the environmental lobby because of
political campaign contributions, membership size, importance of farming interests to the
state economy, and ability to finance television campaigns).
192. Zachary A Smith, Centralizl Doisionmaking in the Administration of Groundwater Rights: The
Eperiee of Arizona, California and New Meio and Suggesions for the Future, 24 NAT. RESOURCES I. 641,685
(1984); Smith, supra note 161, at 247; ASHLEY& SMnr-r, supra note 3, at 49-52.
193. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 400; ASHLEY& SMrrH, supra note 3, at 50.
194. ASHLEY& SMrrH, supra note 3, at 50.
195. Smith, supra note 192, at 686-687.
196. This would be more sustainable that the OCSD importation arrangement,
critiqued supra Part II.A, because users would pay the true cost of importing surface water
and water transfers, made possible because only discreet rights holders will be entitled to
extract water, will likely result in higher-valued uses of the water.
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water as possible until one is sued." '97 California groundwater law reform is imperative
because the current system endorses an unsustainable use of limited resources
statewide. The environmental community and academic circles know this already, but
to pass state legislation, residents of the state must know this too. We must convince
groundwater extractors and groundwater consumers that rights adjudication is in their
best interests now.
197. Gamer, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1022.
